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Abstract. People have generally been very ambivalent about the potential
future roles of new technologies (and the internet specifically) and their
possible  effects on human society. Indeed, there has been a tendency for
polarization between attitudes or perceptions of naive enthusiasm and
cynical resistance towards the use of computers and computer networks,
and for such related concepts as ‘the information superhighway’ and
‘cyberspace’. The projection of such ambivalent perceptions  into naively
utopian (or even ironically dystopian) images and narratives might be
seen as the latest and uniquely global  permutation of a basic function of
human culture - that is, to imagine ‘a better future’ or represent ‘an ideal
past’. This paper will  consider the extent to which the kinds of virtual
utopias made possible by computer-mediated communications are
‘connected’ to the actual individual and social realities of human
participants. In other words, how important might it be to recognise a
distinction between the use of virtual utopias (and utopian representations
in any culture) as merely escapist, self-indulgent fantasy on one hand, and
as a useful,  transformative media for reinventing the human condition on
the other?
Whether we live in a Panoptic or democratic Net ten years from now depends, in
no small measure, on what you and I know and do now.
Howard Rheingold, Afterword to The Virtual Community (1994, p. 310)
Introduction: Emerging Utopian vs Dystopian Images of Cyberspace
In contrast to dominant perceptions of global computer networks as basically an
‘information technology’, the alternative focus on the internet as  new or
extended media of human communication and, indeed, of human community
has been ambivalent at best. Perhaps because the pioneering programs of
internet chat (i.e. MUDS and IRC ) were based around ‘mere’ adventure games
and social chat, the development of synchronous computer-mediated
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communication (CMC) was often seen as a frivolous off-shoot to the main
focus on the internet as an ‘information superhighway’. Rheingold’s popular
book The Virtual Community (1994), which celebrated the utopian potential of
cyberspace in the tradition of the 1960s counter-culture movement, did help to
change the way people perceived the new technology. However, there was an
immediate ‘dystopian’ backlash to such a vision as the original innocence of
network communities gave way to a recognition of not only the internet being
open to use and abuse, but also issues of control and regulation. From such a
perspective Clifford Stoll’s  Silicon Snake Oil (1995), for instance, challenged
what Stoll perceived as a selective view gaining currency in the popular media -
the information superhighway as a ‘computer utopia… said to educate, entertain
and inform’.
 Rheingold’s  vision of a ‘virtual community’ is not the only utopian view of
a cyberspace based on computer-mediated communication. Reflecting the
emerging commercial interest in the internet as programs become more
sophisticated and potential applications more obvious, there are also consumer-
focused models of virtual spaces and communities (e.g. Negroponte, 1995) -
virtual constructions of alternative realities which allow paying customers to
temporarily ‘escape’ their every-day lives and situations. In contrast to the text-
based format for the virtual communities which inspired Rheingold, a ‘theme
park’ model of virtual utopia is exemplified by the kinds of graphics-based
virtual reality worlds being developed by the Worlds Chat project (Cf.
http://www.worlds.net/) where participants take on virtual bodies or ‘avatars’ as
a focus of interaction. In short, such a contrast reflects the kind of tension
between romantic and rationalist versions of a virtual utopia anticipated by the
mid-Eighties project leader of Lucasfilms Habitat project (Morningstar, 1991) -
that is, an opposition between a grassroots, community-focused cyberspace on
one hand, and the designed virtual spaces commissioned by corporate and other
institutional interests on the other.
What has been so ironic about emerging perceptions of cyberspace is how
they have been anticipated and perhaps even influenced by a dystopian science
fiction genre which has become perhaps the emblematic sub-culture of the
internet - cyberpunk (e.g. Dery, 1995). Although basically a marginal literacy
genre, the stories of authors typically associated with the cyberpunk genre (in
particular, Bruce Sterling and William Gibson) have generally ‘connected’ with
key themes and issues of the often disaffected popular youth sub-cultures - as
well as with cutting edge uses and visions of new technologies.  Many of the
Hollywood movies which have integrated notions of cyberspace have reflected
some of the key themes and plots of this genre (e.g. Bladerunner, The
Lawnmower Man, The Terminator, Total Recall) - the film Johnny Mnemonic
being directly based on a William Gibson short story.   Typically, cyberpunk
images and stories pessimistically depict a  futuristic social landscape of
VIRTUAL UTOPIAS AND ACTUAL REALITIES 175
alienated individuals oppressed by systems of control and authority maintained
by a range of new technological means.  However, also typical of the genre is a
secret fascination with these electronic media and a latent and ambivalent belief
that such technologies might still be used to resist and subvert the dominant
order. Just as Clifford Stoll freely admits his own personal ambivalence when
challenging both the virtual community’ and ‘theme park’ models of virtual
utopia, so too the typical sub-cultures of the internet (and self-styled
ethnographers of global electronic culture such as Douglas Rushkoff,  Mark
Dery, and even Howard Rheingold)  tend to be very  ironic about the relation
between cyberspace and normal everyday personal, social and cultural realities.
It should be clear by now that it is not as easy as it appears to distinguish
between the use of virtual utopias (or dy topias) to cater to escapist human
fantasies on one hand, and facilitating personal or social liberation on the other.
This paper proposes to consider ways of  approaching the connection between
virtual and actual realities of human experience and existence in terms of how
emergent notions of virtual utopia are related to the utopian function in human
cultures generally. In such a context the discussion below will address two
related questions. Firstly, are the individual voices of cyberspace  - the invented
and intrinsically plural identities - that participate in computer-mediated
communication somehow still ‘embodied’ and thus connected to physical as
well as social and  cultural realities? Secondly, is it possible to avoid
characterizing cyberspace as some kind of postmodernist simulacrum (or a
separate symbolic order of human representation) which is detached from
every-day individual and social realities - for instance, a domain in which
participants are perpetually engaged in closed games of simulation and
seduction (Baudrillard, 1983).
New World Frontiers and the Utopian Tradition
Rheingold’s personal involvement with the WELL (Whole Earth ‘L ctronic
Link) virtual community - an electronic conferencing group associated with the
Whole Earth Catalog -  provided him with a direct connection between a 1960s
Californian countercultural ethos and the ‘democratizing’ possibilities of
cyberspace. Others (e.g. Kling & Lamb, 1996) have gone further to suggest that
this utopian model of cyberspace might usefully be seen as part of a local
utopian tradition of alternative communities going back to the nineteenth
century. But it is possible to go further to view the Californian model as part of
greater utopian traditions, including that of the American ‘frontier’ mythology
and  post-Enlightenment, western projections of a New World order outside
Europe (including other post-colonial countries besides the United States - such
as Australia).
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 Utopian uses of a frontier rhetoric traditionally delineated between the ‘here
and now’ of a safe, familiar and domesticated suburban world and the wild,
exotic, and ambivalent possibilities on ‘the other’ side of the frontier as a New
World paradise or a place of migrant exile (Richards, 1996). Such
representations tended to merge both physical landscape and cultural or
imaginary perceptions, and also function as a temporal metaphor of past or
future ideal societies as well as a spatial metaphor for projected European
notions of elsewhere and otherness.  Indeed, Rheingold’s (1994) account of the
formation of the Electronic Frontier Foundation makes plenty of suggestive
even if mostly ironic allusions to a pioneering American frontier rhetoric (and
even a ‘Wild West’ ethos). As well as a distinction between external and
internal utopian spaces, the frontier rhetoric of cyberspace incorporates both a
‘forward’ view to an ideal future technological society and a ‘backward’
reference to the model of organic and grassroots rural communities.
Although related to traditional mythical representations of heaven and hell
imagery (e.g. Eliade, 1963), post-Enlightenment models have thus  tended to be
polarized  in terms of a basic distinction between romantic and rationalist
representations of utopia. Many of the classic utopian writers used the genre
primarily to parody or critique their immediate societies (Thomas More,
Jonathon Swift), as others did to either invent an ideal society for a privileged
literary audience  or to entertain a popular audience with myths of a better life
elsewhere. However, the distinct sub-genre of ‘dystopian’ writing in the 20th
century (e.g. Orwell’s 1984 and  Huxley’s Brave New World ) has tended to
oppose both the authoritarian utopias of the nineteenth century and
technological utopias of early modernism (e.g. Berneri, 1950). In short, there is
a significant link between the romantic visions of an organic ‘grassroots’ utopia
and individualistic credos of dystopia which similarly  oppose utopian models
of  technological progress linked to an imposed social order. Similar forces
would seem to be at work in the utopian projections of cyberspace discussed
earlier.
The particular relevance of a distinction between romantic and rationalist
utopias for the present discussion lies in how both views similarly project a
battle between humans (or even nature) and machines in the modern age, a
conflict reflected in a whole host of related oppositions such as emotion vs
reason, and nature vs culture.  Related to this is Morning tar’s (1991)
distinction, referred to earlier, between a top-down ‘creation’ and a bottom-up
‘settlement’ of virtual worlds through the use of computer-mediated
communication. The top-down approach to designing a virtual utopia proceeds
as if a community was the sum of its individual parts - like a machine that can
be engineered. In contrast, as Morningstar  points out, like any community the
virtual communities of the internet have emerged more as a gradual and organic
settlement  - even when designed or engineered (‘while each part of it is
designed and organised by somebody, the totality is not’).
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Many people find it difficult to view computers and their applications in any
other way than in terms of the industrial age metaphor of the machine. This
tendency is reflected in a fear of computers taking over and humans becoming
more passive in their thinking and doing (Roszak, 1994). However, electronic
computer networks work more in terms of wholes, patterns and relationships
than isolated parts or linear connections.  Digital literacy therefore probably has
more in common with an immediate oral literacy than a print literacy reliant on
spatially decoding the parts of language-use (Ong, 1986; Lanham, 1993). A
related problem is an influential  perception that, as the function of a network of
computers, the internet is a kind of machine or artificial media  which humans
interact with. Ironically , as users of computers start to move from a ‘culture of
calculation’ to what Sherry Tu kle calls a ‘culture of simulation’, things only
seem to get more complicated. As Turkle (1994: ch.1) argues, increasing
numbers of  adults as well as a generation of computer literate children  are
tending to think of computers as more like an organism than a machine, and
also increasingly thinking of some human characteristics (i.e. the functions of
the brain) as machine-like.
One reason that computers have become emblematic of what Turkle sees as
a large cultural paradigm shift is the development of a graphical interface which
‘hides’ the computer and  facilitates interaction through the use of visual
metaphors (e.g. Disney characters on a multimedia program).  Like a good
story, designers hope that they can construct an  interface which gets users to
suspend their disbelief and interact more strongly with a particular program.
Likewise, Turkle also discusses in her book Life on the Screen: Identity in the
Age of the Internet (1994) how the use of nicknames and characters in
computer-mediated communication media reinforces a notion of fragmentary
selves and plural identities which challenge traditional senses of an unchanging,
unitary self. What Turkle is implicitly suggesting is that all media of human
interaction and communication are kinds of ‘mirrors’ and that, by being
developed in terms of a ‘culture of simulation’, the computer interface similarly
functions as a cultural mirror to an intrinsic diversity and flux in human
identity.  However, by avoiding the question of whether such diversity and
flexibility are still linked to an embodied self in the real world, Turkle a so
seems to avoid considering further how a computer interface might function as a
media or ‘mirror’ of human communication. She appears to remain content to
merely describe cyberspace as a playful postmodern tool with no particular
purpose except to seduce its users (T rkle, 1994: 26).
Computer Mediated Communication: What Kind of Media?
When attacking the notion of cyberspace in terms of how ‘computer networks
… isolate us from one another and cheapen the meaning of actual experience’,
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Stoll (1995:3) took the view that a machine-mediated media is an artificial
substitute which inevitably opposes face-to-face communication. Indeed, as
even Rheingold (1994:182) concedes, some users of synchronous CMC do
become addicted to internet chat and socially reclusive. However, as Turkle also
argues, computer-mediated communication can also productively augment
human identity and community. At stake here is not only a question of  CMC
perhaps being open to use and abuse - like any medium of communication or
interaction - but the very nature of the connection between the virtual and actual
in human experience. In other words, any challenge to Stoll’s perception needs
to be able to argue a case that CMC is related to, but goes beyond, the
traditional media of communication in human cultural history.
There is a useful connection between changing notions of utopia in human
culture and, for instance, Levinson’s (1990) conception of three historical ages
in the evolution of human media as a context for ‘placing’ the use of the
computer-mediated communication. The first communication age is defined in
terms of the immediate ‘here and now’ interaction of primarily oral cultures.
This age corresponds to the cultural function of utopia as a mythical time and
place - typically a transcendent reality of heavens or paradises opposed by
demonic hells. Similarly,  the second age described by Levinson is that of
mediated communication which is distant in either time or space - as
exemplified by the use of both the written word and printed texts. This age
corresponds to the post-Enlightenment notions of utopia as either an obviously
imaginary society and invented place, or a believed literal reality. Synchronous
computer-mediated communication is emblematic of a third age in that it
embraces aspects of the first two ages as well as being both immediate and
mediated. Perhaps this corresponds with a notion that a distinction might be
made between escapist models of virtual utopia and those linked to human
actuality.
Like Mark Poster’s (1995) model of two electronic ages of communication -
a model which compares the linear sequence  of ‘broadcasting’ with the ‘two-
way, decentralized communication’ of the digital interface - Levinson’s model
also implicitly recognises the central importance of the reader or user in the
process of mediated communication. However, it goes further to provide a
framework for focusing on  the problem of the connection between the virtual
and actual in human experience in terms of a similar relation between the
rhetorical and actual (i.e. immediate) aspects of any human media.
In similar fashion to Turkle, Poster adopts a postmodernist model for
interpreting the use of digital media (and especially hypertext) in terms of
readers or users being the central focus of any communication as producers or
constructors of their own meaning and identity. The problem with this model is
that it suggests that an author’s or designers’ strategy of meaning - as distinct
from literal intention - is merely contingent and accidental in the overall scheme
of things. It does not distinguish between the literal intention of an author or
designer and a rhetorical strategy which frames and elicits the response of
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readers or users. Moreover, it does not distinguish between the use of a media of
communication as a function of translation on one hand, and one of
transformation on the other. Poster argues that his model subverts that of a
linear and hierarchical relation between senders and receivers (also, producers
and consumers) of communication. But, in many ways, it merely reverses and
ultimately reinforces the very model it opposes. The collective as well as
individual reader or user  effectively replaces the writer or designer as a locally
contingent (rather than objectively literal) constructor of meaning and the
transformer of a particular media.
As Ong (1982:176) has suggested - when discussing the ‘secondary orality’
of technologically-mediated communication - the difference between immedia e
communication and the strictly mediated kinds of communication such as print
texts is that participants are more obviously senders and receivers at the same
time and engaged in a process of dialogue (even, as Ong further stresses, when
individuals interact ‘with themselves’).  In other words, a linear model of
communication viewing media as either a transparent window or a
postmodernist mirror tends to ignore how the production of meaning through
any media of communication is ever a process of dialogical interaction
(Bahktin, 1986; Taranhao, 1990).
The work of Paul Ricoeur (1976, 1986) develops a similar insight as a basis
for not only viewing a possible convergence between the virtual and actual in
human experience, but - as will be discussed below - also a distinction between
the use and abuse of a utopian rhetoric. Going beyond Derrida’s ‘postmodernist’
delineation between writing and speaking as separate systems of
communication, Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation treats all human media as if a
‘here and now’ interaction and any act of communication - either a face-to-face
interaction or via a written text - in terms of various aspects of non-local
mediation. On one hand, this perspective recognises that oral interactions are
just as much expressed through a linguistic and cultural filter of preconceptions
and stereotypical prejudices as any other text. On the other hand, Ricoeur’s
particular use of reader-response theory focuses on how a reader embodies and
activates the ‘immediate’ dimension of a printed or distantly-mediated text in
such rhetorical terms as the linguistic uses of tenses (past, future, subjunctive,
etc.) - and not simply a merely subjective response to the surface content of any
media.
In other words, Ricoeur tells us that we should treat all human
communication as if a virtual process linked to actual human realities. If we
read a book, for instance, we should imagine ourselves engaged in dialogue
with a persona or mask of the writer, a rhetorical identity with a particular
strategic purpose of communication (as distinct from literal intentions). In this
way, a reader might avoid confusing a necessary, as distinct from sufficient,
connection between the virtual and actual identities of a particular writer or
designer of texts. In contrast to both the humanists and postmodernists, Ricoeur
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recognises a sufficient rather than necessary link between an organising sense of
self and the multiple selves or personas which people often take on. Such advice
obviously has useful application to computer-mediated communication.
Many critics, including Stoll (but mostly those that have never or rarely
interacted in this way), hold that CMC is inevitably superficial and impersonal
and relies on an artificial and disembodied media of communication. Such a
view is partly related to the fact there is clearly a lack of the kinds of contextual
and non-verbal cues which characterize face-to-face communication (facial
expression, tone of voice, etc.). If computer-mediated communication is viewed
as just a matter of human-machine interaction then the playful, informal and
often intimate language-use and dialogue which typically characterize internet
chat might be conveniently dismissed as a pale imitation of ‘real’ human
relationships - notwithstanding how virtual friendships are sometimes physic-
ally consummated and even occasionally lead to marriage. But a view of
humans interacting with other humans using a computer network media  -
especially in terms of partially collapsing the distinction between  immediate
and mediated communication - provides a context for several arguments against
this latter view.
One argument that can be made is that users of text-based CMC programs
have developed ways of using verbal cues that provide context and represent
typical non-verbal cues (e.g. as reflected in the vocabulary of shorthand
expressions that have built up around internet chat, including the use of so-
called ‘emoticons’).  Many of the critics referred to above who are familiar with
various forms of CMC would support a further argument that internet chat
actually often encourages a less inhibited, more democratic and even,
paradoxically, a typically more personal and creative form of human interaction
and language-use than is generally the case in the normal everyday
conversations that take place in modern, suburban societies. Indeed, a number
of substantial studies have been made of how CMC can empower marginalized
or disadvantaged individuals and various groups, and promote collaborative
learning practices and global perspectives in educational contexts especially
(Lea, 1992; Herring, 1996).
In general, computer mediated communication represents a specific media
which uniquely converges the functions of language and technology as
symbolic and physical media or tools (i.e. of the mind and body) respectively
for human interaction with the world. The product of this convergence - so-
called cyberspace - thus needs to be appreciated as a rhetorical locus of
symbolic action which links the cultural or imaginary and physical, material
dimensions of human reality.  The question remains whether such links can be
sustained by the kind of postmodernist culture of simulation described by
Turkle.
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Rediscovering the Virtual Dimension of Human Actuality: and Vice Versa
One key implication of the discussion so far is that, as Sherry Turkle suggests,
computer mediated communication provides a useful basis for recognising that
all human experience, knowledge and communication is somehow represented
and mediated as functions of language and culture - and therefore filtered
through a mixture of both individual and collective preconceptions and
expectations. Turkle’s ambivalence about a computer culture of simulation
would seem to be also reflected in her uncertainty about how to interpret what
she sees as a gradual erosion of the human capacity to distinguish between
virtual and actual realities.
Such a view - especially in so far as Turkle views the internet culture as
representative of an emerging global postmodernist culture - is perhaps
consistent with Baudrillard’s (1985) notion that individuals and societies in the
contemporary age have become enmeshed in an electronic media of
communication that can only simulate reality (i.e. a simulacrum). For
Baudrillard, people today are increasingly and inevitably living in the kind of
global mass media culture in which the words and images  of others (especially
advertisers) have become detached not only from their physical referents, but
also even from conventional meanings. People are increasingly discovering that
identities and objects which appear to be fixed and certain often dissipate and
transform upon closer inspection. If cyberspace also represents a merely
seductive and distortional semblance or simulation of the world, then CMC
participants are indeed similarly ‘trapped’ in the kind of postmodernist
simulacrum which many critics believe rules the conventional mass media and,
thus, both individuals and societies in the contemporary age.
The culture of simulation described by Turkle refers to the ability of
computer applications to provide substitutes for reality across a range of human
activities. This includes the learning of skills and knowledges safely in a
simulated situation before  actual practice or tests (e.g. learning to fly an air
force jet using a simulator). A central focus of her own work is on the use of
computer mediated communication  to simulate human identity and social
interaction. Just as it may be asked whether a culture of simulation provides an
effective basis for learning real-life skills and knowledges, so too whether it is
possible for people to get beyond virtual role-playing with multiple identities to
connect with or develop an enduring and transformed sense of self acting in and
upon the world.
Put another way, is it possible to tell when people are deceiving others in
internet chat, to ‘hear’ an authorizing voice behind the various roles, characters
and avatars? An exemplary instance of this issue is when participating
characters have indeterminate or even ‘suspicious’ identity. As any regular user
of internet chat is aware, there is always the possibility that the other character
has engaged in virtual ‘gender-swapping’ or some other pretence (i.e. they may
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even be a programmed ‘bot’).  As Turkle (1995:212) suggests, it is difficult for
anyone to sustain the illusion of the opposite gender since there are always
subtle verbal indicators and cues of how gender inflects ‘speech, manner, the
interpretation of experience’. But there is also the additional factor that CMC is
a medium which encourages immediate intimacy, especially in one-on-one
interactions. The very fact that people knowingly engage in reciprocating role-
play, and that there is a relative absence of obvious contextual and non-verbal
cues (which often contradict and confuse), tends to ‘expose’ the voice behind
the mask. Ironically, then, it may be sometimes easier in internet chat than in
face-to-face interaction to tell whether a person is being sincere and genuine or
not. In the relatively safe context of CMC simulation, people are often  ready to
share private worlds and  secret hopes and fears  - to reveal vulnerable, sincere
and organizing senses of self.  Such a self need not be reduced to either actual
biography or virtual persona, but rather be seen as a dialogical interplay of unity
and multiplicity.
The problem with simulation is not when people view this as f reality, but
when they treat reality s if a simulation (i.e. a novice jet fighter pilot obviously
does not get a second chance to avoid crashing in a real flight). On the other
hand,  it is clear that if people suspend their disbelief or simply embody an
attitude of participation, then simulation  or virtual activity involving the use of
imagination can be a powerful tool for learning and applying actual skills and
knowledges - that is, for extending one’s ‘comfort zone’ of familiarity. It would
seem to be important, then, to recognise that cyberspace is primarily or
ultimately also a function of human culture and imagination. In other words,
there are pragmatic reasons for replacing a human-m chine interface model
with a view that the internet might be most productively interpreted as case of
humans communicating with other humans (or even themselves) and interacting
with the actual world using computer networks as a transformative and
interactive media of communication.
Turkle’s more ambivalent conception of a postmodernist culture of
simulation - in contrast to Baudrillard’s quite pessimistic and dystopian pers-
pective - implicitly reflects a different view of human media of communication.
Baudrillard represents a particular postmodernist view that derives from the
Marxist notion that ideologies which inevitably distort and manipulate people
are the pre-condition of any social condition and human interaction. Other
poststructuralist Marxists taking a similar starting point (e.g. Althusser) began
to realize in the nineteen-sixties that ideologies not only work at the informal
and personal level as well as in the public and institutional domain of discourse,
but also are open to use and abuse as an unavoidable basis of human
communication. In short, there is another stream of postmodernism, typified by
Turkle’s view of the internet, which simply takes a non-committal, ambivalent
strategic position - about the personal, social and cultural functions of utopian
rhetoric as well as that of ideology.
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By recognising that metaphor, narrative and virtual imagination generally are
constitutive or central aspects of human thought and language-use, the
dialogical framework of Paul Ricoeur is perhaps more usefully situated to
critically distinguish the connection between virtual and actual realities in
human experience.  In terms of an overriding distinction between ‘ideology as a
symbolic confirmation of the past, and utopia as a symbolic opening towards
the future’, Ricoeur (1986) makes a crucial delineation between merely escapist
and unachievable uses of virtual or imagined utopias which project onto distant
‘other’ locations of time and space, and transformative, achievable uses that are
‘grounded’ in the here and now of overlapping physical, social and cultural
realities. Such a distinction should also be applied to the distinction between
romantic and rationalist utopias discussed earlier. Naïvely romantic versions of
a utopian rhetoric conceived in a vacuum are just as escapist as those more
sophisticated and engineered visions of a technological society free of crime,
poverty and disease. However, as suggested by the example of pioneering
virtual communities, a ‘grassroots’ utopian vision which connects with an
effective ‘top-down’ framework or design may just provide a model for the
connection between virtual  or imagined and actual, achievable utopias.
According to Ricoeur, both the imagined and lived stories, images and
experiences of all humans contribute to individual and collective memory of the
past as a basis for recognising future possibilities and potentials. As a process of
transformation rather than merely of translation, simulations of self, society and
reality are both virtually and actually linked to acting bodies, local
communities, and cultural worlds. It is ironic then that, as well as wanting to
connect with like-minded people with similar interests,  one reason many people
participate in ‘cybersociety’ is possibly to seek out a sense of community which
seems to be disappearing in the closed worlds of much contemporary suburban
life (Jones, 1995; Castells, 1996). This should remind us that the very notion of
‘community’ has never been located merely in terms of the physical proximity
of people, but has always been connected to the cultural (and therefore ‘virtual’)
mediations and networks of human communications.
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